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The banking industry has contracted from over 18,000 institutions in the 1980s to just 
over six thousand banks today. Since 98 percent of banks have fewer than $10 billion in 
assets the overwhelming majority of industry consolidation is concentrated in the 
community banking sector. Research shows that while some of the decline can be 
attributed to bank failures, the majority of it is due to the collapse of new bank formation. 
In order to slow the decline of the community banking sector and attempt to replenish the 
“stock” of community banks lost to failure and consolidation, policymakers should 
consider taking several steps to releave community banks from some of the more 
burdensome regulations that impair their ability to lend. Additionally, policymakers 
should encourage the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to ease some of their 
requirements in order to charter a de novo bank.   
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To: President & CEO,  
Independent Community Bankers of America 
From: Aaron Stetter 
Re: Policy Recommendations to Protect and Grow 
the Community Banking Sector 
 
Action-Forcing Event 
 According to a recent American Banker article, the banking industry has 
contracted from over 18,000 institutions in the 1980s to just over 6,400 in the first quarter 
of 2015. Since 98 percent of banks have fewer than $10 billion in assets* the 
overwhelming majority of industry consolidation is concentrated in the community 
banking sector.1 Furthermore, some predict industry consolidation to continue into 2016 
and beyond. According to one analyst, “Industry conditions continue to indicate that 
consolidation is inevitable.”2 
 
Statement of the Problem 
If the community banking sector continues to consolidate and lose market share at 
the current rate and if there continues to be a lack of new entrants to replenish the “stock” 
of community banks lost to failure or merger, many individual borrowers, farmers and 
small businesses will be harmed as they search to replicate the lending expertise of the 
community banking sector. According to a recent study on the future of community 
banking: 
                                                          
* For purposes of this paper community banks are defined as banks below $10 billion in assets unless noted 
otherwise.  
1 Victoria Finkle, “Is Dodd-Frank Really Killing Community Banks?” American Banker, August 18, 2015. 
2 Jeff Bater, “Small, Midsize Bank Consolidation Will Continue, M&A Advisor Says,” Bloomberg BNA, 
January 27, 2016. 
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Our assessment of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation data finds that 
community banks service a disproportionately large amount of key segments of 
the U.S. commercial bank lending market – specifically, agriculture, residential 
mortgage, and small business loans. However, community banks’ share of U.S. 
banking assets and lending markets has fallen from 40 percent in 1994 to around 
20 percent today.3  
 
Research from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas shows that banks below $10 
billion in assets have seen their market share decrease over a twenty-year time period. 
Community banks accounted for 64 percent of $4.6 trillion in banking assets in 1992. By 
2015, their market share dropped to 19 percent of $15.9 trillion in total assets.4 This is 
crucial as agriculture, residential mortgage and small business lending calls for lenders 
with particular localized knowledge and expertise of agricultural and mortgage markets, 
commodity prices, local economies and business cycles to make prudent loans while also 
maintaining maximum flexibility for the borrower. 
Community banks play a key role in residential real estate lending as they make 
up nearly 16 percent of the mortgage market.5 In 2013, the default rates of loans secured 
by one-to-four-family residential properties ran at 3.47 percent for banks with $1 billion 
or less in assets versus 10.42 percent for banks with more than $1 billion in assets. 
Furthermore, portfolio default rates for residential mortgages held by community banks 
ran at 0.20 percent versus 1.64 percent overall from 2003–2012 demonstrating 
                                                          
3 Marshall Lux & Robert Greene, “The State and Fate of Community Banking,” Harvard Kennedy School, 
February 2015, pg. 1. 
4 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, “Too Small to Succeed?—Community Banks in a New Regulatory 
Environment,” Financial Insights, Volume 4, Issue 4, December 31, 2015, pg. 1. 
5 Tanya D. Marsh & Josh W. Norman, “The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Community Banks,” American 
Enterprise Institute, May 2013, pg. 14.  
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community banks’ ability to match their customers with residential mortgage products 
that work best for them as opposed to one-size-fits-all products offered by competitors.6 
In regards to small business lending, the ability of the community banking sector 
to rely on “soft information” such as preexisting relationships or reputation, allow them 
to tailor loans for borrowers with irregular income or a lack of audited financial 
statements or financial data. According to a recent study, “Small-business lending, in 
particular, is one area in which small banks can competitively distinguish themselves by 
utilizing nonstandardized information gathered in the course of a long banking 
relationship.”7  This rationale is particularly true in rural America. According to a recent 
study on small business lending in rural areas: 
Ascertaining the creditworthiness of rural small businesses can pose a number of 
challenges, not the least of which is that many rural small businesses are hard-
information deficient. Rural small businesses are less likely than their urban peers 
to have audited financial statements, further reducing the amount and usefulness 
of hard information about their creditworthiness.8 
 
Furthermore, community banks play a critical role in supporting local economies 
and civic groups in many rural and micropolitan areas that have fewer banking 
alternatives. In 2012, community banks were the only banks operating in 615 counties in 
the U.S. According to a 2014 study, “more than one-third of U.S. counties, with a total 
                                                          
6 Lux & Greene, pg. 2, 6-7. 
7 Hester Peirce, Ian Robinson & Thomas Stratmann, “How Are Small Banks Faring Under Dodd-Frank?” 
Mercatus Center, George Mason University, February 2014, pg. 12. 
8 Robert DeYoung, Dennis Glennon, Peter Nigro & Kenneth Spong, “Small Business Lending and Social 
Capital: Are Rural Relationships Different?” University of Kansas, Center for Banking Excellence, June 
2012, pg. 2. 
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population of over 16 million people, would have limited physical access to mainstream 
banking services without the presence of a community bank.”9 
 
History 
The Financial Crisis & Lack of New Bank Entry 
The financial crisis of 2008 had a profound effect on the commercial banking 
sector. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, the number of commercial 
banks shrank by 14 percent, over 800 institutions, between 2007—2013. Most of the 
reduction was concentrated in the community banking sector where 839 institutions 
under $1 billion in assets or 32.9 percent of the marketplace disappeared.10 The research 
shows that while some of the decline can be attributed to bank failures the majority of it 
is due to the collapse of new bank formation. Entry into banking during this time frame, 
commonly referred to as de novo activity, had been virtually nonexistent as there were 
only six banks chartered from 2011 through 2015 with zero new charters in 2012 and 
2014. From a historical perspective, the only other period where de novo activity was 




                                                          
9 Arthur E. Wilmarth, “A Two-Tiered System of Regulation is Needed to Preserve the Viability of 
Community Banks and Reduce the Risks of Megabanks,” GWU Law School Public Research Paper No. 
2014-53, 2014, pg. 290. 
10 Roisin McCord & Edward Simpson Prescott, “The Financial Crisis, the Collapse of Bank Entry, and 
Changes in the Size Distribution of Banks,” Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, First 
Quarter 2014, pg. 30. 
11 Roisin McCord, Edward Simpson Prescott, and Tim Sabik, “Explaining the Decline in the Number of 
Banks Since the Great Recession,” Economic Brief, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, March 2015. 
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The Financial Crisis – Community Bank Experience12 
YEAR 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* 
# of 
Institutions** 
8,305 8,012 7,658 7,357 7,083 6,812 6,509 6,182 
Mergers 293 179 197 196 208 232 273 305 
Failures 25 140 157 92 51 24 18 8 
De Novo 
Charters 
98 31 11 3 0 2 0 1 
Problem 
Bank List 
252 702 884 813 651 467 291 183 
*as of Sept. 30th 
**includes commercial banks and savings institutions 
 
The lack of new bank formation during this timeframe may be traced to a 
deliberative attempt by the FDIC to increase capital and examination requirements on de 
novo banks that may have discouraged investors from forming new banks. According to 
an August 2009 Financial Institution Letter (FIL) from the FDIC to the banking industry, 
“Under current policy, newly insured FDIC-supervised institutions are subject to higher 
capital requirements and more frequent examination activities during the first three years 
of operation. The FDIC is extending its procedures for these institutions from three to 
seven years.”13 While the FDIC did indicate in a November 2014 FIL that they would 
return to the practice of three years of capital planning and heightened examination 
scrutiny they were careful to maintain complete discretion to go beyond the three years of 
planning should they deem it necessary. According to this FIL, five years after the 2009 
letter, “the FDIC may seek a higher level of capital for those proposals displaying 
                                                          
12 FDIC, “Statistics at a Glance,” September 30, 2015. 
13 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Enhanced Supervisory Procedures For Newly Insured FDIC-
Supervised Depository Institutions,” Financial Institutions Letter, FIL-50-2009, August 28, 2009.  
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heightened risk profiles or complexity, such as with respect the proposed institution’s 
anticipated size, complexity, and business strategy.”14  
In addition to the financial crisis of 2008, the evolution of branching laws in the 
U.S. may have served to increase industry consolidation as well as the legal and 
regulatory requirements that limited the size and number of banks were gradually 
eliminated over time. As far back as 1960, banks were not allowed to branch across state 
lines. In 1966, Congress amended the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 allowing 
interstate banking only within states that expressly permitted it. However, interstate 
banking was not acted upon until 1978 when Maine allowed out-of-state bank holding 
companies the ability to operate within the state.15 The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal) effectively knocked down the 
remaining barriers to interstate banking. After Riegle-Neal became law, the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Richmond found an increase in consolidation as stronger, larger banks 
acquired smaller, weaker ones to take advantage of economies of scale. As a result, the 
number of commercial banks fell to less than 7,000 institutions by the year 2000.16 
Steady industry consolidations continues today. 
 
The Legislative Response to the Financial Crisis 
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). Dodd-Frank is widely considered to 
                                                          
14 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Guidance Related to the FDIC Statement of Policy on 
Applications for Deposit Insurance,” Financial Institutions Letter, FIL-56-2014, November 20, 2014.  
15 Hubert P. Janicki & Edward Simpson Prescott, “Changes in the size Distribution of U.S. banks: 1960-
2005,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Quarterly, Fall 2006, pg. 296. 




be one of the most sweeping and expansive pieces of legislation ever enacted on the 
financial sector. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s 2010 Annual 
Report, “Congress passed the law to improve accountability and transparency in the 
financial system and to protect consumers and investors from abusive practices in 
response to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.”17 Another summary of 
the law created shortly after enactment characterized the Act as:  
Massive and far-reaching financial reform legislation that will have a major and 
lasting impact on the financial condition and operations of US banks, nonbank 
financial institutions, and non-US banking organizations and other financial 
services organizations doing business in the United States.18 
 
Among the various sweeping reforms of the law, Dodd-Frank created a new 
regime in charge of monitoring the financial stability of the largest and most 
interconnected financial institutions; it formed a framework for unwinding these banks 
should they falter; and, perhaps most important to the community banking sector, it 
established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to oversee consumer 
protections regarding financial products.19 Specifically, Dodd-Frank charged the CFPB 
with ensuring that consumers are provided with timely and understandable information so 
they can make informed and responsible financial decisions; protecting consumers from 
unfair, deceptive or abusive acts and practices; ensuring that financial services providers 
are following federal consumer financial law as well as taking appropriate enforcement 
                                                          
17 Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, “Making History: Regulatory Reform Enacted,” 2010 Annual 
Report, pg. 1. 
18 Meyer Brown, “Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 




actions against violators.20 Several of the new rules and regulations promulgated by the 
CFPB cause considerable consternation in the community banking sector today. 
It is important to note that Dodd-Frank exempts banks under $10 billion in assets 
(i.e. community banks) from a number of provisions, not the least of which is an 
exemption from examination and enforcement by the CFPB. While banks of all sizes are 
required to comply with new CFPB rules, the CFPB itself does not examine community 
banks under $10 billion in assets. Compliance examinations remain with the banks’ 
prudential regulator. While noting these exemptions, a recent GAO Report stated, 
“However, the act is comprehensive and far-reaching and includes many provisions that 
impose additional requirements on small insured depository institutions.”21 
 
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Small Business 
The financial crisis hit small businesses particularly hard as community bank 
capital dried up and became less available to the firms that rely on it most. According to a 
recent working paper by former U.S. Small Business Administration Administrator Karen 
Gordon Mills: 
Small firms are always hit harder during financial crisis because they are more 
dependent on bank capital to fund their growth. Credit markets act as a “financial 
accelerator” for small firms, such that they feel the credit market swings up and 
down more acutely.22 
 
                                                          
20 Government Accountability Office, “Dodd-Frank Regulations: Impacts on Community Banks, Credit 
Unions and Systemically Important Institutions,” December 2015, pg. 10. 
21 Ibid, pg. 12. 
22 Karen Gordon Mills & Brayden McCarthy, “The State of Small Business Lending: Credit Access During 




Since 1995, small businesses have created two out of every three jobs in the 
United States. Between 2007 and 2012, the small business share of total job loss was 
about 60 percent with the smallest firms, those with fewer than 50 employees, suffering 
the greatest losses. Small businesses are back to creating two out of every three net new 
jobs but there remains a significant gap.23 
Despite economic crises and steady industry consolidation, community banks 
remain prolific small business lenders in the United States. In the decade prior to the 
financial crisis (1998-2008) community bank lending to small businesses doubled in 
volume. In 2000, community banks were responsible for 57 percent of all small business 
lending. That number stands at 51 percent today.24  
 
Background  
Industry Consolidation & Harm to Consumers 
 According to numerous press reports and academic articles written over the last 
several years, the financial crisis of 2008 along with the passage of Dodd-Frank has 
exacerbated the decline of the community banking sector as banks continue to merge and 
consolidate out of existence. The issue of consolidation is compounded by the lack of 
new bank formation, or de novo activity, as new banks are not formed at a steady enough 
rate to replenish the “stock” of banks lost through merger. A recent American Banker 
article stated:  
More recently, the lack of new banking charters is playing a big role – as banks 
continue to merge and close, there’s been little influx of new institutions to 
                                                          
23 Mills & McCarthy, pg. 3.  
24 Lux & Greene, pg. 11-12. 
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balance that out. That’s a critical factor to consider when looking at the decline in 
the number of banks over the past several years.25   
 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond finds that new-bank formation has fallen 
from an average of about 100 per year since 1990 to an average of about three per year 
since 2010. The decline in new bank entry disproportionately impacts community banks 
as new banks start small.26 According to recent FDIC data, the number of commercial 
banks and savings institutions has decreased from 8,305 in 2008 to 6,182 as of September 
30, 2015. Over this period, 1,883 institutions merged with other banks while 515 failed.27  
The decrease in the overall number of community banks coupled with the fact that only 
six de novo banks were chartered between 2011 and 2015, with zero in 2012 and 2014, is 
cause for alarm in the community banking sector. This timeframe captures the worst of 
the financial crisis, the passage of Dodd-Frank, as well as implementation of many of the 
Act’s regulations that financial institutions — particularly community banks — still 
wrestle with today.  
If the community banking sector continues to consolidate and lose market share at 
the current rate and if there continues to be a lack of new entrants to replenish the “stock” 
of community banks lost to failure or merger many individual borrowers, farmers and 
small businesses will be harmed as they search to replicate the lending expertise 
historically demonstrated by the community banking sector but may face fewer and less 
attractive borrowing options. For example, default rates for residential mortgages held in 
a banks’ portfolio were much higher for larger institutions than community banks 
                                                          
25 Finkle, “Is Dodd-Frank Really Killing Community Banks?” 
26 McCord, Prescott & Sabik.  
27 FDIC, “Statistics at a Glance,” September 30, 2015.  
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between 2003 and 2012 demonstrating community banks’ ability to match their 
customers with residential mortgage products that work best for them.28  
In regards to rural lending, a study examining 18,000 Small Business 
Administration (SBA) loans made by both rural and urban banks found that small 
business loans made by rural community banks defaulted much less often than those 
originated by urban banks.29 This is crucial when considering that community banks are 
often the sole banking center in many rural areas as more than one-third of U.S. counties, 
representing over 16 million people, would have limited physical access to mainstream 
banking services if not for their local community bank.30 Concerning small business 
lending: 
Bank credit, particularly through term loans, is one of the primary sources of 
external financing for small businesses — especially Main Street firms — and is 
key to helping small firms maintain cash flow, hire new employees, purchase new 
inventory or equipment, and grow their business.31  
 
Historically, large banks have cut back on small business lending during financial 
crises. For example, Bank of America’s small business lending contracted from $25 
billion in 2006 to $12 billion in 2014 while Wells Fargo’s decreased from $45 billion in 
2007 to less than $25 billion in 2014.32 Conversely, small business lending at community 
banks slightly increased during roughly the same timeframe even though the share of 
                                                          
28 Lux & Greene, pg. 2, 6-7. 
29 DeYoung, Glennon, Nigro & Spong, pg. 22.  
30 Wilmarth, pg. 290.  
31 Mills & McCarthy, pg. 4. 
32 Kevin Wack, “Small Businesses Are Unhappy With Online Lenders,” American Banker, March 3, 2016. 
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total assets at community banks declined. Furthermore, small business lending by 
community banks grew at a faster clip in 2013 and 2014 than larger banks.33  
While other firms may be able to meet some of the credit needs of America’s 
mortgage seekers, rural borrowers and small businesses, the loan products may be less 
safe, the terms less favorable and the customer experience less satisfying than at a 
community bank.  
  
Regulatory Burden on Community Banks 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that community banks have a difficult time 
navigating the new rules and regulations imposed upon them in the post-financial crisis 
world. Many community banks lack the expertise and financial resources necessary to 
ensure compliance while absorbing increased regulatory costs. According to a recent 
study discussing the difficulty community banks have with new regulations:  
Our findings suggest that Dodd-Frank has deeply affected small banks. They are 
spending more time and money on compliance and, in some cases, are shifting 
away from products, such as residential mortgage loans, for which the regulatory 
burden appears to outweigh the benefits of continued involvement.34 
 
Survey data shows that nearly 90 percent of responding community bankers 
reported an increase in compliance costs with 82.9 percent reporting an increase of over 
five percent from the previous year.35 According to a 2015 survey conducted by the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), regulatory compliance accounted for 11 
                                                          
33 Wilmarth, pg. 293.  
34 Pierce, Robinson and Stratmann, pg. 12. 
35 Ibid, pg. 34. 
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percent of personal expenses, 16 percent of data processing expenses, 20 percent of legal 
expenses, 38 percent of accounting and auditing expenses and 48 percent of consulting 
expenses. From the survey, “To the extent that these percentages are accurate and 
representative of the community banking industry, they imply a hypothetical compliance 
cost to community banks, in these areas alone, of $4.5 billion annually. This would 
represent 22 percent of their net income.”36 
 
Several of these new rules stem from the CFPB. One survey reported that 37 
percent of community bank respondents reported hiring additional compliance staff in 
response to CFPB-specific rules. One CFPB rule that vexes community bankers is the 
Qualified Mortgage (QM) rule. The QM rule imposes rigorous standards of proof on the 
lender to assure that the loan is not needlessly risky in addition to extensive 
documentation of the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. If the loan is deemed QM, then 
the lender will receive certain protections against lawsuits brought by the borrower and 
                                                          
36 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, “Community Banking in the 21st Century,” Annual Community 
Bank Research and Policy Conference, September 30-Oct. 1, 2015, pg. 11.  
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protections against their ability to avoid foreclosure.37 According to a 2015 survey, “66 
percent of respondents said they do not provide loans that are outside the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau’s Qualified Mortgage definition or would only do so in 
special cases.”38 
One community banker noted in his survey response, “This piece of regulation is 
written so unclearly with so many trip wires that serve no benefit to customers, that we 
anticipate not offering a mortgage product.”39 Another respondent noted, “All the 
uncertainty and changing in definitions related to qualified mortgages, mortgage banking 
requirements and so forth has made the business of serving customers by helping them 
become homeowners much more difficult, cumbersome and time consuming.”40 
While new CFPB mortgage rules are a convenient target for bankers’ ire they are 
not the only regulatory “pain point” for community banks. Many community bankers 
struggle with new capital requirements as part of Basel III. Basel III is an international 
agreement originally designed to strengthen capital levels at the largest and most globally 
interconnected financial institutions but applies to community banks in the United States 
as well. Community bankers also struggle with the increased burden from filing the 
quarterly Call Report that has grown exponentially over the years as well as the 
frequency and duration of compliance examinations. 
 
 
                                                          
37 James DiSalvo & Ryan Johnston, “Banking Trends, How Dodd-Frank Affects Small Bank Costs,” 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, First Quarter 2016, pg. 14-15. 
38 Independent Community Bankers of America, “2014 ICBA Community Bank Lending Survey,” 
Executive Summary, January 2015.  
39 Pierce, Robinson and Stratmann, pg. 49.  
40 Ibid, pg. 52. 
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Online Marketplace Lenders 
One area in need of discussion when considering the future of community 
banking is the emergence of online marketplace lenders such as OnDeck Capital, 
Kabbage and Lending Club. According to a recent article in Forbes, Kabbage offers 
prospective borrowers with lines of credit up to $100,000 payable over 6 months. The 
average line of credit is $25,000 and the average borrower takes 6 to 8 loans a year 
totaling $50,000. Note that the annual percentage rate (APR) of these loans can be 
upwards of 27 percent, much higher than the typical APR offered by a more traditional 
lender. Kabbage is reported to keep their default rate low by targeting established 
businesses using an automated lending model that assesses capacity to repay, the 
character of the borrower, and the consistency or stability of the business.41 
While this model may work for the smallest firms that become habitual borrowers 
of short-term credit, many small businesses still fall outside of “model-based” 
marketplace lending. This further demonstrates the continued importance of community 
bank lending in this space.  According to a recent study: 
Small banks can fill a niche stemming from their ability either to successfully 
lend to what have been variously described as ‘informationally opaque’ 
borrowers—borrowers without long credit histories suitable for credit-scoring or 
other model based lending practices.42 
 
Additionally, it is unclear if online marketplace lenders would continue to lend to 
small businesses in an economic downturn, such as the recent Great Recession. 
                                                          
41 Darren Dahl, “The Six-Minute Loan: How Kabbage Is Upending Small Business Lending -- And 
Building A Very Big Business,” Forbes, May 6, 2015.  
42 Pierce, Robinson & Stratmann, pg. 12. 
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According to one study, “In keeping with their business strategy of building strong 
relationships, community banks proved to be more reliable sources of credit to small 
businesses during the last two banking crises, compared with lager banks.”43 It remains to 
be seen if online marketplace lenders will continue to lend during a similar crisis or if 
they will have the ability or capacity to perform loan modifications or “workouts” with 
their borrowers should they default on a payment. While it appears that online 
marketplace lending will proliferate over the next several years, it is not clear if they will 
continue to provide credit to their customers, as community banks have done, in an 
historic economic downturn.  
Furthermore, a recent small business credit survey conducted by the Federal 
Reserve Banks of New York, Atlanta, Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Richmond and 
St. Louis found the overwhelming majority of small business borrowers that worked with 
online marketplace lenders were dissatisfied with their experience. The survey found that 
online lenders received a satisfaction score of only 15 out of 100, far lower than 
community banks that received a satisfaction score of 75.44 One of the authors of the 
survey stated, “The two most common reasons that successful applicants cited for their 
dissatisfaction with online lenders were high interest rates and unfavorable repayment 
terms, a catchall category that could include prepayment penalties.”45 This further 
demonstrates the harm caused to individual small businesses should community banks 
continue to consolidate and exit the marketplace.  
                                                          
43 Wilmarth, pg. 292.  
44Claire Kramer Mills, PhD, “2015 Small Business Credit Survey, Report on Employer Firms,” Federal 
Reserve Banks of New York, Atlanta, Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Richmond & St. Louis, March 
2016, pg. iii.  




Several policymakers representing the prudential regulatory agencies have 
publicly called for some level of regulatory relief for community banks. While addressing 
an annual conference Federal Reserve System Chair Janet Yellen stated: 
When it comes to bank regulation and supervision, one size does not fit all. To 
effectively promote safety and soundness and ensure consumer compliance 
without creating undue regulatory burden, rules and supervisory approaches 
should be tailored to different types of institutions…The Federal Reserve is 
committed to this approach of community bank oversight and to ensure that new 
and existing regulations are not unduly burdensome for community banks.46 
 
FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas M. Hoenig supports relief for banks, especially 
community banks, that adhere to a safer and less complex business model. According to 
Hoenig, “For the vast majority of commercial banks that stick to traditional banking 
activities and conduct their activities in a safe and sound manner with sufficient capital 
reserves, the regulatory burden should be eased.”47 Current Senate Banking Committee 
Chairman Richard Shelby (R-AL) as well as Ranking Member Sherrod Brown (D-OH) 
have also shown support for the community banking sector. Unfortunately, their varying 
proposals to provide community banks with regulatory relief have been nullified due to 
differing political ideologies. According to a recent American Banker article, 
“Washington is unlikely to reach compromise over regulatory relief for community banks 
anytime soon. That’s because the battle over regulatory relief is not about politics. It’s 
                                                          
46 Janet L. Yellen, Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Community Banking in the 
21st Century,” The Third Annual Community Bank Research and Policy Conference, September 30, 2015, 
pg. 3-4. 




about ideology.”48 The political “right” represented by Chairman Shelby and others is 
calling for less government intervention in the banking sector while the political “left” 
supported by Sens. Brown and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) view banking services as a 
public utility that should be devoid of risk and more widely available to the average 
consumer. Unfortunately, community banks appear to be caught in the middle of this 
ideological battle.  
 
Policy Proposal 
Policy Authorization Tool 
 The Independent Community Bankers of America (the Association) should 
support Federal legislation to amend Section 18 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 
U.S.C. 1828) in an effort to provide targeted regulatory relief for banks that adhere to 
traditional banking characteristics based on activity and complexity, not merely size. This 
legislation is based on but not identical to the “Hoenig Proposal” as offered by FDIC 
Vice Chairman Thomas M. Hoenig.49 According to the proposal, banks that hold 10 
percent tier one equity capital, refrain from trading and limit their derivatives exposure 
would be eligible for significant regulatory relief. This relief would include exemptions 
from certain mortgage rules, new capital requirements, as well as be eligible to file a 
short form call report and benefit from an expanded examination cycle. 
                                                          
48 Richard J. Parsons, “Warring Ideologies Dash Small Banks’ Hopes for Reg Relief,” American Banker, 
September 25, 2005. 
49 Thomas Hoenig, Vice Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “A Conversation about 
Regulatory Relief and the Community Bank,” 24th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference, National Press 
Club, April 15, 2015. 
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Additionally, the Association should encourage the FDIC to issue supplemental 
guidance reaffirming its intention to administer the policies of Part 303 of the FDIC’s 
Rules and Regulations (12 U.S.C. 1815) subjecting newly insured depository institutions 
to three years of capital and business planning requirements and more frequent 
examinations as opposed to seven years.50 This would augment the “Questions & 
Answers” document of November 2014 that left the FDIC with considerable discretion to 
go above and beyond the three year requirements if deemed appropriate.51 In order to 
encourage investment into new bank formation the FDIC should issue more definitive 
guidance to effectively nullify their August 2009 policy requiring seven years of planning 
and heightened examinations.52  
 
Policy Implementation Tool 
Banks that meet the following criteria would be eligible for regulatory relief: 
 Hold 10 percent tier one equity capital; 
 Hold effectively zero trading assets or liabilities; 
 Hold no derivative positions other than interest rate swaps and foreign 
exchange derivatives 





                                                          
50 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “DSC Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies,” 
accessed on 3/10/16: https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section12-1.pdf.  
51 FDIC, Financial Institutions Letter, FIL-56-2014, November 20, 2014. 
52 FDIC, Financial Institutions Letter, FIL-50-2009, August 28, 2009. 
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Regulatory relief provisions for eligible institutions include: 
 Automatic Qualified Mortgage (QM) status for all mortgage loans held in 
a bank’s portfolio; 
 Exemption from certain Basel III capital rules, such as the capital 
conservation buffer; 
 Use of a short form Call Report to be developed by the prudential 
regulators; 
 Eligible for a 24-month examination cycle.53 
 
In regards to encouraging investment into new bank charters, the FDIC has the 
statutory authority – under Part 303 of their Rules and Regulations (12 U.S.C. 1815) – to 
administer guidance to clarify their policies of subjecting newly insured depository 
institutions to three years of planning and more frequent examinations as opposed to 
seven years.  
 
Policy Analysis 
Strengths of the Modified Hoenig Proposal   
The modified version of the Hoenig proposal would provide meaningful targeted 
regulatory relief to the vast majority of commercial banks. According to Hoenig, only 
400 of the nation’s 6,000 plus banks would not meet the criteria to receive regulatory 
relief and zero banks over $100 billion in total assets would qualify. Furthermore, only 90 
of the 4,000 banks with less than $250 million in total assets would fail to qualify.54  
                                                          
53 These regulatory relief provisions closely mirror but are not identical to those proposed by FDIC Vice 
Chairman Thomas M. Hoenig.  
54 Hoenig, “A Conversation about Regulatory Relief and the Community Bank.” 
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 Validating the effectiveness of the Hoenig proposal, The New York Times 
financial services reporter Gretchen Morgenson said, “It actually outlines smart ways to 
give regulatory relief only to low-risk, traditional banks that did not cause the financial 
crisis. Those institutions that did contribute to the 2008 mess get no relief under the 
plan.”55 
 One of the key elements of the plan is to incentivize banks to hold higher levels of 
tier one equity capital as it is the most effective capital a financial institution can deploy 
during a financial crisis to remain solvent. According to Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig 
who authored the book entitled The Bankers’ New Clothes, What’s Wrong with Banking 
and What to Do about It, there are several advantages to banks holding more equity 
capital. Namely, more equity would reduce the likelihood that a bank would fail or 
dissolve in an economic crisis leading to an overall safer and more stable financial 
system. Banks with more equity financing and less debt are known to make better loans 
where highly indebted banks are prone to taking excessive risks and banks that can 
withstand economic volatility are in a better position to lend during a crisis.56 
 Another key benefit is the meaningful regulatory relief gained by meeting the 
requisite criteria. As mentioned above, community banks are struggling with certain rules 
and regulations. One example being the new Qualified Mortgage or QM standard for 
residential mortgage loans. If banks meet the appropriate criteria, they would be allowed 
to consider all mortgage loans held in portfolio as “qualified mortgages” thus limiting 
their litigation risk should the borrower default. During the financial crisis and 
                                                          
55 Morgenson, “Regulatory Relief for Banks That Rarely Fail.” 
56 Anat Admati & Martin Hellwig, “The Bankers’ New Clothes, What’s Wrong with Banking and What to 
Do about It,” Princeton University Press, 2013, pg. 220. 
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subsequent legislative battle, then House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney 
Frank (D-MA) referred to a concept he called “skin in the game” where a lender would 
be required to hold at least 5 percent of a loan on their books in order to encourage 
prudent responsible lending. According to Frank: 
If I can make a whole bunch of loans and sell the entire right to collect those to 
somebody else, at that point I don't care...whether or not they pay off. We have to 
prohibit that. We're basically saying now, 'You've got to keep 5 percent of that.' 
So that if there are losses, you lose money, too.57 
 
Automatic QM status for loans that remain on the banks’ books where the lender 
retains 100 percent of the risk is the ultimate version of “skin in the game.” A recent 
study by the Housing Finance Policy Center revealed that portfolio loans – those that are 
held on a lender’s balance sheet – accounted for roughly 27 percent of total originations 
in 2014, the highest level in a decade.58  
 In regards to Basel III, the prudential banking regulators plan on applying it to all 
bank charters in the U.S. regardless of size or business model. One summary of the rule 
found: 
Basel III is the most complete overhaul of U.S. bank capital standards in nearly a 
quarter of a century. It comprehensively revises the regulatory capital framework 
for the entire U.S. banking sector and will have significant implications for 
community banks from a business, operations, M&A and regulatory compliance 
perspective.59  
 
                                                          
57 Chris Arnold, “Forcing Banks to Put More 'Skin in The Game,” National Public Radio, June 18, 2009. 
58 Karan Kaul, “What’s behind the growing share of bank portfolio lending?” Urban Wire, Housing and 
Housing Finance, March 18, 2015.  
59 Luigi De Ghenghi & Andrew S. Fei, “Basel III: Guide for Community Banks,” Davis Polk & Wardwell 
LLP, October 2013. 
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While some concessions were eventually made for community banks, they are 
still required to comply with many of the complex capital rules and calculations of Basel 
III. One concession being a provision that will no longer allow banks to consider 
mortgage servicing assets (MSAs) as common equity capital.60 Requirements such as the 
new capital treatment of MSAs are overly burdensome and costly to community banks. 
Appearing before a congressional committee, one community banker testified that the 
MSA provision of Basel III would cost his $270 million community bank over $1.6 
million in common equity tier one capital, reducing their tier one ratio by 50 basis 
points.61 Exempting banks that meet the appropriate criteria from certain Basel III capital 
requirements would allow them to focus key resources on lending in their communities or 
fortifying their balance sheet.  
 Community bankers have become increasingly concerned with the growing 
burden of filing their quarterly Call Report, officially known as the Reports of Condition 
and Income. A 2014 survey found strong evidence that the current call reporting 
requirements for community banks are an ever-increasing burden on their ability to serve 
their customers. According to the survey, “Community banks are increasingly forced to 
complete more and more schedules to comply with increased regulation without regards 
to the size of the institution or the resources available to the community bank to meet 
reporting obligations.” Furthermore, nearly three quarters of survey respondents indicated 
that a short form call report would reduce their regulatory burden significantly.63  
                                                          
60 Ibid.  
61 Samuel A. Vallandingham, “Examining Regulatory Relief Proposals for Community Financial 
Institutions, Part II,” Testimony before the Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial 
Institutions and Consumer Credit, July 15, 2014.  




 In regards to an extended examination cycle, the original Hoenig proposal calls 
for an 18-month cycle for highly rated banks. The modified version calls for a 24-month 
cycle. This provision follows recent action by the prudential banking regulators to allow 
highly rated banks with less than $1 billion in assets to qualify for an 18-month 
examination cycle. According to the Federal Reserve, an additional 617 banks would 
qualify for less frequent exams.64 The plan recommended above would allow a greater 
number of highly rated banks to take advantage of an even longer cycle.  
Finally, in order to address the lack of new bank formation, the FDIC should issue 
guidance to further clarify and relax their capital and business planning and heightened 
examination requirements on de novo banks. As earlier noted, new bank formation has 
stalled in recent years as only six banks were chartered from 2011 through 2015 with no 
new charters in 2012 and 2014. This lack of activity is unprecedented. Calling for further 
clarity from the FDIC may help spur investment in chartering de novo banks that will 
help replenish the “stock” of community banks lost to failure and consolidation since the 
Great Recession.  
 
Weaknesses of the Modified Hoenig Proposal 
The capital markets are highly competitive and it is difficult for many community 
banks, particularly those in rural or economically depressed areas, to raise outside capital. 
Since the criteria to be eligible for regulatory relief is tied to a tier one equity capital level 
of 10 percent, this proposal could potentially exclude a number of community banks that 
simply cannot raise the requisite funds necessary to qualify for relief. For those 
                                                          
64 John Heltman, “More Banks to Qualify for 18-Month Examination Cycle Under New Rule,” American 
Banker, February 19, 2016.  
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individuals and organizations that would like to increase regulatory requirements on 
banks, the purposeful exclusion of a wide swath of banks could be viewed as a key 
feature of the proposal and not a weakness. Taking that under consideration, the higher 
bar for inclusion should be viewed as a negative consequence for the Association charged 
with promoting the policy needs of the community banking sector at large. Supporting 
higher capital levels could potentially disenfranchise a number of community banks that 
simply cannot meet the new requirements.   
Furthermore, the procyclical nature of the relief provisions would decrease the 
number of institutions eligible to take advantage of them during an economic downturn 
as the added regulatory burdens would hit community banks at the absolute worst time. 
For example, if an individual banks’ tier one equity capital were to dip below 10 percent, 
their residential loan portfolio would become subject to the QM rule, they would have to 
comply with all of the capital requirements of Basel III and would no longer be able to 
take advantage of the short form call report or extended examination cycle.  
Additionally, an easing of FDIC de novo requirements for new bank charters may 
increase the number of bank failures during a financial crisis as new charters are known 
to fail in greater numbers, particularly after year three. According to the FDIC, 
“Depository institutions insured less than seven years are overly represented on the list of 
institutions that failed during 2008 and 2009, with most of these failures occurring 
between the fourth and seventh years of operation.”65 In the run-up to the financial crisis, 
many of these institutions grew rapidly and were not prepared from a capital or 
management perspective to address the historic decline in the value of both commercial 
                                                          
65 FDIC, Financial Institutions Letter, FIL-50-2009, August 28, 2009. 
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and residential real estate.66 When those values declined, some banks were left without 
enough capital to weather the storm. The increased number of bank failures puts added 
stress on the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) during a crisis and will lead to special deposit 
insurance assessments to be paid by all banks to restore the DIF.  
 
Political Analysis 
 In order to advance a modified version of the Hoenig proposal, it is critical to gain 
bipartisan support from key members of Congress, particularly those on the House 
Financial Services and Senate Banking Committees. Fortunately, House Financial 
Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling (R-TX) has been an outspoken advocate 
for community bank regulatory relief and recently declared his intention to advance his 
own version of the proposal. According to a recent American Banker article: 
Republicans were "deep into our planning" about an alternative reform bill, 
outlining several components. The chief one is allowing banks to be released from 
certain Dodd-Frank and Basel III requirements if they hold higher capital. That 
idea was first suggested by Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Vice Chairman 
Thomas Hoenig, who has argued that the current regulatory regime is too 
complex for most institutions.67 
 
Chairman Hensarling’s declaration coincides with recent legislation introduced by 
Rep. Ed Perlmutter (D-CO), also a member of the House Financial Services Committee. 
Perlmutter’s bill, similar to the Hoenig proposal, would provide targeted regulatory relief 
                                                          
66 Michael Shumaker, “Is The Time Right for De Novo Banks?” BankDirector.com, January 23, 2015.  
67 Ian McKendry, “Hensarling's 'Bold Alternative' for Reform Includes Big Capital Change,” American 
Banker, March 15, 2016.  
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for banks that adhere to traditional banking characteristics based on activity and 
complexity, not merely size. According to a press release issued by the Congressman:  
Community banks were not the cause of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, yet 
they are now forced to bear the burden and expense of complying with new 
regulatory requirements in place to prevent future crises. This legislation will help 
ease the regulatory burden for the vast majority of banks who engage in 
traditional banking activities and conduct their activities in a safe and sound 
manner.68  
 
 In regards to the Senate, both Senate Banking Committee Chairman Richard 
Shelby (R-AL) and Ranking Member Sherrod Brown (D-OH) have been publicly 
supportive of regulatory relief for community banks. When discussing his own regulatory 
relief proposal, Shelby said: 
It goes without saying that these institutions – like the more than 150 community 
banks currently operating in Alabama – provide vital support to local economies, 
including the role they play in small business lending.  That is why my legislation 
provides regulatory relief for community financial institutions that have been 
smothered with excessive regulations since the passage of Dodd-Frank.69  
 
For any regulatory relief legislation to pass the Senate it is crucial that the 
proposal be viewed as relief for community banks and not the largest banks as 
community banks remain politically popular and trusted among the general public. As 
demonstrated below, community banks maintain a higher percentage of trust regarding 
                                                          
68 Ashley Verille, “Perlmutter Introduces Regulatory Relief Legislation for “Traditional Banks,” Helps 
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Press Release, February 26, 2016.  
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banking, finance and the economy than Wall Street firms, investment companies and 
even the Federal Reserve.  
70 
Furthermore, supporters of regulatory relief legislation will have to address 
opposition from Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA), the 
current ranking member of the House Financial Services Committee, as both are 
outspoken critics of any legislative proposals that could potentially undermine the Wall 
Street reforms of the Dodd-Frank Act. At a recent Senate Banking Committee Hearing 
Warren said, “We should be very skeptical of regulatory relief bills that are promoted as 
helping small banks but that are pushed by ABA (American Bankers Association) 
lobbyists for the big banks.”71 According to The Wall Street Journal: 
                                                          
70 Timothy R. Homan, “The Financial Crisis’ Long Hangover,” Morning Consult, July, 27, 2014.  
71 Ryan Tracy, “Warren Throws Water on ‘Regulatory Relief’ for Small Banks,” The Wall Street Journal, 
February 13, 2015. 
29 
 
The hearing was the second this week on “regulatory relief” for community banks 
and credit unions. But Ms. Warren’s exchange with an ABA representative 
underscored the rocky road ahead for any legislation designed to provide that 
relief. If a bill backed by the Republican majority goes too far in changing Dodd-
Frank, it might lose Democratic support. 
 
To neutralize opposition from the Warren-Waters contingent, it is critical to 
secure bipartisan support from rank-and-file members of Congress as well as key 
stakeholders representing the financial regulatory community including Chair Janet 
Yellen and Governor Daniel Tarullo from the Federal Reserve, Chairman Martin J. 
Gruenberg and Vice Chairman Hoenig from the FDIC as well as Comptroller of the 
Currency Thomas J. Curry. Fortunately, all of the above have publicly demonstrated 
some level of interest in protecting and preserving the community bank charter. 
Establishing broad public, bipartisan support will be instrumental in the effort to advance 
regulatory relief for community banks.  
 One area of the proposal that will receive particular scrutiny and potential 
opposition is any effort to pressure the FDIC to relax their de novo policies. The FDIC 
itself is likely to push back against this as, in their view, they have already sufficiently 
clarified the three-year capital and business planning and heightened examination 
policies. To support their autonomy to go above and beyond the three-year planning 
requirements for certain new firms, the FDIC is likely to focus on data that exhibits an 
increase in the number of de novo failures between years four and seven during the 




 In their effort to influence FDIC policy, the Association will need to recruit 
sympathetic members of congress, particularly those on House Financial Services and 
Senate Banking, and urge them to exert their oversight authority to call for hearings into 
the lack of new bank formation since the Great Recession.  Legislators can also circulate 
a Dear Colleague letter urging the FDIC to review and possibly amend their de novo 
chartering policies in addition to calling on the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to study the possible effects the lack of new bank formation has on the economy 
and job growth.  
 This approach does carry significant risk as industry advocates can exert some 
level of influence over the hearing process and the proposed GAO report but cannot 
control the outcomes of either. For instance, a GAO report or hearing may conclude that 
more de novo banks will be at greater risk of failure during a crisis putting too much 
pressure on the DIF, thus threatening the stability of the financial system. This could lead 
to special deposit insurance assessments in order to replenish the depleted insurance fund. 
The hearing and report could also conclude that there isn’t significant interest from 
investors in forming new banks due to economic conditions caused by historically low 
interest rates. Also, this process allows critics of the banking sector at large, including 
consumer groups such as Americans for Financial Reform and the Center for Responsible 
Lending, to publicly criticize those advocating for policies that they perceive could put 







 If industry consolidation continues at the current rate without the benefit of new 
bank formation, a significant portion of residential mortgage seekers, rural borrowers and 
small businesses will be harmed as they are forced to look elsewhere for credit. While 
online marketplace lenders or the largest banks may be able to meet some of their credit 
needs, the loan products may be less safe, the terms less favorable and the customer 
experience less satisfying than at a community bank. In order to maintain optimal credit 
availability for these borrowers, policies should be advanced to preserve and protect the 
community bank charter. 
One of the major benefits of the modified Hoenig proposal advocated above is its 
effectiveness in providing targeted regulatory relief to banks that need and deserve it 
most. Another key attribute is that it encourages banks to hold a higher percentage of tier 
one equity capital that engenders an overall safer and more stable financial system, better 
lending practices and a greater likelihood that banks will continue to lend in an economic 
downturn.  
Furthermore, the proposal provides meaningful relief from some of the most 
burdensome regulations that bankers continue to struggle with today including the 
CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage rule, the complex capital calculations of Basel III, as well as 
offering an extended examination cycle and short form call report for highly rated banks.  
These are tangible reforms that individual community bankers have been demanding 
since the passage of Dodd-Frank.  
As the major drawback to the proposal, a number of community banks in rural or 
economically depressed areas will find it difficult to meet the 10 percent tier one capital 
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threshold. Moreover, banks that fall under the 10 percent threshold will see their 
regulatory burden increase dramatically. With that said, the meaningful relief provided 
for the majority of banks that struggle to comply with these regulations outweighs the 
reality that some will be left to deal with higher regulatory scrutiny. Furthermore, based 
on the popularity and high level of trust the general public has in the community banking 
sector, in addition to strong bipartisan support from lawmakers and the regulatory 
community, such a proposal is politically feasible. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
Association endorse the modified version of the Hoenig proposal and work to advance 
Federal legislation to enact it into law.  
In regard to the lack of new bank formation, there is heightened risk to the 
community banking sector and the Association by publically pressuring the FDIC to 
embrace less strict capital and business planning and examination requirements for de 
novo banks. The FDIC itself is likely to oppose such efforts as it increases the risk to the 
Deposit Insurance Fund and arguably the greater economy. Therefore, it is recommended 
that the Association not directly pressure the FDIC to embrace less strict requirements. In 
lieu of this suggestion, it is recommended that the Association work with concerned 
policymakers to pursue a congressional hearing to focus on the lack of new bank 
formation. A hearing will help raise the profile of this issue while falling short of making 
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